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THE SUCCESS OF JUDGE FRANKEL'S
SENTENCING COMMISSION
MICHAEL TONRY*
Judge Marvin Frankel's proposal that specialized administra-
tive agencies be established and charged to set standards for sen-
tencing, prescribed as a means to reduce the "lawlessness" in
sentencing that Judge Frankel argues characterizes America's in-
determinate sentencing systems,' has been tested and been vali-
dated. Sentencing commissions in some jurisdictions have operated
much as Judge Frankel hoped they would. Some commissions have
achieved and sustained specialized institutional competence, insu-
lated sentencing policy from short-term "crime of the week" po-
litical pressures, and maintained a focus on comprehensive system-
wide policymaking. Guidelines promulgated by commissions have
altered sentencing patterns and practices, reduced sentencing dis-
parities and gender and race effects, and shown that sentencing
policies can be linked to correctional and other resources, thereby
enhancing governmental accountability and protecting the public
purse.
Many readers may be surprised by the preceding summary of
experience with sentencing commissions and their guidelines. The
disastrous experience of the best known commission, the United
States Sentencing Commission, is well known. 2 How, a reader
might reasonably ask, can the commission idea be a success if its
most prominent example is a failure?
The experience of the federal commission is misleading in two
ways. First, as elaborated below, the federal commission is but
one of a dozen or more. In some states, notably Delaware, Min-
nesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington, the experience has
been much happier. Second, and more important for assessment
of the viability of Judge Frankel's proposal, the evidence sup-
porting the substantive failure of the federal guidelines also dem-
onstrates the institutional capacity of sentencing commissions to
establish system-wide sentencing policies, to change sentencing
* Sonosky Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Minnesota Law
School.
1. MARvIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
2. For a recent review of the evidence and arguments, see Michael Tonry, The
Failure of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines, 39 CRIm AND DELINQ. 131 (1993).
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practices, and to structure the discretion of sentencing judges.
This commentary has three sections. The first section explains
why the federal commission, though patently a failure from the
perspective of responsible policymaking, nonetheless shows that
commissions can be the effective policy machines Judge Frankel
envisioned. The second canvasses state experience with sentencing
commissions to show that some sentencing commissions have suc-
cessfully established and implemented responsible sentencing poli-
cies. The third briefly introduces major issues now on the agendas
of state sentencing commissions.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL "SUCCESS" OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
COMMISSION
Judge Frankel proposed establishment of an administrative
agency called a sentencing commission which, through guidelines
it would promulgate, would bring the rule of law to sentencing.
The crux of the proposal concerns the institutional capacities of
administrative agencies. Rulemaking authority has been delegated
by legislatures to countless state and federal administrative agencies
on the bases that-far better than any legislature-they can achieve
and maintain specialized competence concerning complex subjects,
have some degree of insulation from short-term political emotions
and pressures, and can adopt a comprehensive systems approach
to policymaking.
From that perspective, the federal sentencing commission has
been at least a partial success. No one can doubt that it has
achieved specialized competence. Through its rulemaking processes,
it has proposed and promulgated hundreds of changes to its guide-
lines, policy statements, and supporting commentary in efforts to
restrain what it perceives as wilfully noncompliant judges, and to
fine-tune its policies.' Through its monitoring and evaluation staffs,
the commission has assembled mountains of data and published
numerous annual and evaluation reports-at least some of which,
notably its report on mandatory penalties, 4 demonstrate high levels
of technical competence and policy sophistication.
The commission has taken a comprehensive systems approach
to policymaking, as is evidenced by its efforts to devise guidelines
3. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT-1991 (1992) [herein-
after ANNUAL REPORT 1991]; U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT-1990 (1991).
4. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY PENALTIES].
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for all federal offenses, to monitor the guidelines' implementation,
to counterbalance the plea bargaining strategies of prosecutors and
defense counsel, and to train probation officers to serve as guard-
ians of the guidelines.
The most powerful evidence that the federal commission has
succeeded institutionally is that federal sentencing practices have
been radically altered. Sentencing patterns have changed as the
commission intended: the proportion of cases sentenced to pro-
bation has declined greatly and average prison terms for many
offenses have lengthened.5
In a 1991 self-evaluation, the commission reported that the
percentage of convicted federal offenders sentenced to probation
declined from 52 percent in late 1984 to 35 percent in June 1990.6
The commission's evaluation data, however, overstate current use
of probation, presumably by counting as "probation" sentences
that include a period of incarceration as a condition. The com-
mission's 1991 annual report shows that only 14.5 percent of
offenders in 1991 received "probation-only" sentences. 7 When 1985
probation-only rates for selected offenses are compared with 1991
rates, the following patterns appear: robbery-18 percent (1985),
.3 percent (1991); fraud-59 percent, 22 percent; and immigration
offenses 41 percent, 16.8 percent. 8
The severity of prison sentences similarly increased. The com-
mission found that the mean "expected to be served" sentence for
all offenders increased from twenty-four months in July 1984 to
forty-six months in June 1990. Sentence lengths for drug offenses
increased by 248 percent from 1984 to 1990. 9
None of this is to argue that the federal guidelines have been
a substantive success. They are, and deserve to be, deeply disliked.
Of hundreds of people who testified about them before the Federal
Courts Study Committee, only four, then-Attorney General Ri-
chard Thornburgh and three members of the commission, sup-
ported the guidelines.' 0
5. II U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A RE-
PORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY
IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BAR-
GAINING (1991) [hereinafter SELF-EVALUATION].
6. Id. at 378.
7. Id. at tbl. 3.
8. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL GUIDELINES
AND POLICY STATEMENTS 68 (1987); ANNUAL REPORT 1991, supra note 3, at tbl. 23.
9. SELF-EVALUATION, supra note 5, at 378.
10. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT
1993]
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The guidelines, which took effect on November 1, 1987, are
the most controversial and disliked sentencing reform initiative in
this century. They are commonly criticized on policy grounds (that
they unduly narrowly limit judicial discretion and unduly shift
discretion to prosecutors), on process grounds (that they foresee-
ably cause circumvention by judges and prosecutors), on techno-
cratic grounds (that they are too complex and difficult to apply
accurately), on fairness grounds (that by taking only offense ele-
ments and prior convictions into account, they require that very
different defendants receive the same sentence), and on normative
grounds (that they have greatly increased the proportion of offen-
ders receiving prison sentences and are generally too harsh)."
Within two years of taking effect, "more than two hundred
district judges invalidated the guidelines and all or part of the
Sentence Reform Act.' ' 2 Those decisions were necessarily couched
in constitutional terms, but the number of cases and the vehemence
of the opinions suggest that the underlying problem was the judges'
deep antipathy to the guidelines themselves. In Mistretta v. United
States, 3 an eight to one decision of the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal commission, the
guidelines, and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
At day's end, no matter how misguided the federal guidelines,
and despite their inability to win support from the people who
must implement them (which means they will fail in the long-
term), the guidelines have succeeded in recasting federal sentencing.
Where Judge Frankel's model failed in the federal system is
in respect of political insulation. Most proponents of guidelines
have seen its capacity to resist short-term emotions and politics as
a great strength. The federal commission, by contrast, made no
effort to insulate its policies from politics and superficial emotion.
One sign of this is a mantra-like invocation by the commission of
"reduction of undue leniency" in sentencing as one of the guide-
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 142 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE].
11. For full citation and summaries of evidence on each point, see Gerald W. Heaney,
The Reality of Guideline Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161
(1991); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits
on the Discretion of Sentences, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901
(1991); Tonry, supra note 2.
12. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT-1989, at 11 (1990).
13. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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lines' primary objectives, 4 even though the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 includes no equivalent language among its enumerated
statutory purposes. 5 The commission apparently decided that the
Department of Justice and the most law-and-order members of the
United States Congress were its primary constituency and it estab-
lished and attempted to enforce policies that pleased that constit-
uency. This is presumably why the commission ignored a statutory
directive to tie its policies to available correctional resources, 6 why
it chose to ignore a statutory presumption against incarceration of
first offenders not convicted of violent or other serious crimes, 7
and why it reacted to harsh mandatory minimum penalty provisions
for many drug offenses by making the guidelines even harsher.' 8
Thus the federal experience shows that, as an institution, a
sentencing commission can operate like administrative agencies do
on other subjects. The state experience supports that conclusion
but also shows that commissions can develop successful sentencing
policies that win the support of practitioners, tie policy to resource
allocation, and achieve substantively sound sentencing policies.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE SUCCESS OF THE STATE SENTENCING
COMMISSIONS
Were there not a federal sentericing commission, no one would
question that Judge Frankel's proposed new approach to formu-
lation of sentencing policies has been markedly successful, both
institutionally and substantively. In 1978, just a few years after
the appearance of Judge Frankel's book and long before passage
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Minnesota and Pennsyl-
vania enacted sentencing commission legislation and, in 1980 and
1982 respectively, guidelines took effect in both states.19 Since then,
14. See, e.g., MANDATORY PENALTIES, supra note 4, at i ("The goals of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 were to reduce unwarranted disparity, increase certainty and severity,
and correct past patterns of undue leniency.").
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1991(b) (1988).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (1988): "The Commission in promulgating guidelines . . . shall
take into account the nature and capacity of the penal, correctional, and other services and
facilities available .... The sentencing guidelines prescribed under this chapter shall be
formulated to minimize the likelihood that the federal prison population will exceed the
capacity of the federal prisons."
17. 28 U.S.C. § 994(j): "The Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the
general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which
a defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an
otherwise serious offense."
18. See Michael Tonry, Salvaging The Sentencing Guidelines in Seven Easy Steps, 4
FED. SENTENCING REP. 355 (1992).
19. On Pennsylvania, see John Kramer, The Evolution of Pennsylvania's Sentencing
1993]
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guidelines developed by sentencing commissions have taken effect
in Washington, 20 Oregon, 2' and Louisiana.2 2 Guidelines will take
effect in Kansas early in 1993.23
Of the guidelines now in effect, those in Minnesota, Pennsyl-
vania, Washington, and Oregon have been in operation long enough
that evidence concerning their operation is available. State com-
missions have achieved Judge Frankel's institutional purposes. They
have established and sustained specialized technical competence.
In all four states, the commissions have survived to serve as their
state's principal forum for sentencing policy proposals. Each com-
mission has developed a monitoring system and has considered or
implemented guidelines changes to respond to implementation
problems revealed by monitoring programs. Each commission con-
ducts regular training sessions and publishes annual statistical re-
ports. Minnesota's commission in 1984 prepared the most
sophisticated evaluation of a state sentencing initiative ever pub-
lished. 24 All four commissions are wrestling with current policy
issues. Pennsylvania, in particular, is now considering a major
overhaul of its guidelines and some of their underlying policy
premises.
To some extent, the state commissions have served to insulate
sentencing policy from short-term emotionalism and law-and-order
sloganeering. Throughout most of the 1980s, Minnesota defied the
national pattern of rapidly rising prison populations, as did Wash-
ington for five years after guidelines implementation, and as has
Oregon since its guidelines were implemented in 1989. Eventually,
in both Minnesota and Washington, sentencing policies did change
to reflect the law-and-order politics of the 1980s;25 perhaps it is
no coincidence that penalties in both states were increaged sub-
stantially in 1989, only months after Willie Horton's voter-galva-
nizing appearance in the 1988 presidential campaign.
Guidelines, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Aug. 1992, at 6; on Minnesota, see Debra L. Dailey,
Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines-Past and Future, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Feb. 1992, at
4.
20. On Washington, see Roxanne Lieb, Washington State: A Decade of Sentencing
Reform, OVERCROWDED TIMES, July 1991, at I.
21. On Oregon, see Kathleen M. Bogan, Sentencing Reform in Oregon, OVERCROWDED
TIMES, Mar. 1991, at 5.
22. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:321 to -29 (West 1992).
23. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-9101 to -05 (Supp. 1991).
24. KAY A. KNAPP, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION,. THE IMPACT OF
THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION (1984).
25. See Roxanne Lieb, Washington Prison Population Growth Out of Control, OVER-
CROWDED TiMS, Feb. 1993, at 1; Richard S. Frase, Prison Population Growing Under
Minnesota Guidelines, OVERCROWDED TIMES, Feb. 1993, at 1.
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The state sentencing commissions also adopted comprehensive
systems approaches to sentencing policy. Minnesota, Washington,
and Oregon all fitted their sentencing policies to available or
foreseeable prison resources, 26 taking the theretofore unknown, but
unassailable, position that responsible policymaking requires that
states face up to the programmatic and financial implications of
the sentencing policies they adopt. Policies can be tailored to fit
resources, or resources can be expanded to meet projected needs;
one way or the other a "resource constraint" policy requires
conscious and responsible decisionmaking, a practice conspicu-
ously absent in the 1980s in most American states, where punish-
ments were repeatedly raised without regard to resources and
foreseeably resulted in unprecedented prison overcrowding and
federal court intervention. As a result of the resource constraint
policy, each of the commissions had to reduce penalties for some
crimes when pressures arose to increase penalties for others. 27
To this point, the experience of the federal and state com-
missions is institutionally similar. The experience differs only in
the quality of the guidelines the state commissions produced and
the success of their implementation. Three points of comparison
stand out.
First, unlike the federal guidelines, which remain deeply un-
popular with judges and lawyers five years after their implemen-
tation, the guidelines in Washington, Delaware, Pennsylvania,
Minnesota, and Oregon are generally supported by criminal court
practitioners.2" In no state is there heated debate about the guide-
lines' desirability and legitimacy and in no state is there organized
opposition to them.
Second, in all of these states, guidelines successfully shifted
sentencing practices toward greater use of state prison punishments
for violent offenders and lesser use for property offenders. 29 In all
of these states, monitoring data has revealed that compliance with
guidelines is high. In Minnesota, where both internal and external
evaluations have been completed, sentencing disparities were mark-
edly reduced.30 (One can probably infer from high guidelines com-
pliance rates in the other states that disparities in their courts also
diminished). By contrast, because of defective research designs
26. See Dailey, supra note 19; Lieb, supra note 25; Bogan, supra note 21.
27. See, e.g., concerning Minnesota, DALE PARENT, STRUCTURING SENTENCING Dis-
CRETION: THE EVOLUTION OF MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1988).
28. See sources cited supra notes 19-20; on Delaware, see Richard S. Gebelein,
Sentencing Reform in Delaware, OVERCROWDED TIMEs, Mar. 1991, at 5.
29. See sources cited supra notes 19-20; see also Gebelein, supra note 28.
30. KNAPP, supra note 24.
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used in the U.S. Commission's 1991 self-evaluation, no one knows
whether federal disparities have declined.3
Third, as noted earlier, until legislation compelled Washington
and Minnesota sentencing commissions to toughen penalties in
1989, those states successfully maintained prison populations within
available capacity and maintained lower than average incarceration
rate increases, thereby avoiding out-of-control corrections spending
and federal court intervention.32 In Oregon, population control
continues. By contrast, the U.S. Commission ignored its statutory
directive to link policy to resources and, as a result, the federal
prison population grew by sixty percent between year-end 1987
and mid-1992, and the federal prisons are now operating at 158
percent of capacity.33
To be sure, not all state sentencing commissions have suc-
ceeded. Some, like those in New York and South Carolina,3 4
developed guidelines but could not persuade legislators to adopt
them. In Pennsylvania3" and Kansas,36 legislatures rejected initial
sets of proposed guidelines and commissions came forth with less
ambitious, but salable successors. In some states, for example
Florida, the guidelines are not well respected and are of little
influence.37 At day's end, however, Judge Frankel's proposal has
experienced remarkable success. It has been adopted by Congress
and by more than a dozen states, and in many jurisdictions has
operated as Judge Frankel envisioned and has accomplished the
purposes he aimed to achieve.
III. THE COMMISSIONS' FUTURES
The commissions now in operation, both the pioneers and the
newcomers, face similar issues.38 First, although no commission in
31. See, e.g., 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. (Nov./Dec. 1992).
32. See sources cited supra note 25.
33. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FOUR PERCENT
MoRE PRISONERS IN FIRST HALF OF 1992 (1992).
34. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, KAY A. KNAPP & MICHAEL TONRY, THE SENTENCING
COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 24-25 (1987); PAMALA L. GRISET, DETERMINATE SENTENC-
ING: THE PROMISE AND THE REALITY OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1991).
35. Kramer, supra note 19.
36. David J. Gottlieb, A Review and Analysis of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines,
39 KAN. L. REV. 65, 67-68 (1991).
37. Michael Tonry, Structuring Sentencing, in 10 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 294 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1988).
38. See Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing
Structures, 64 U. CoLo. L. REV. 679 (1993).
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its initial years attempted to develop guidelines for nonincarcerative
sentences, in part because development of incarceration guidelines
was challenge enough, in part because of the lack of community-
based punishments in most jurisdictions, and in part because no
one knew how to do it, commissions are currently at work in
many states on proposals to integrate intermediate and noncusto-
dial penalties into guidelines and to devise systems of interchange-
ability between prison and non-prison sanctions. 9
Second, the wisdom of the Minnesota-Washington-Oregon de-
cision to tie sentencing policies to corrections resources has become
ever clearer and other states are beginning to follow suit. For
example, in Pennsylvania, where the link was rejected on policy
grounds in the early 1980s, the commission is now revisiting the
idea.
Third, no jurisdiction has as yet devised an adequate system
for controlling plea bargaining under a sentencing guidelines sys-
tem. If allowed, sentence bargains can nullify any system of guide-
lines. Charge, or "fact" bargaining in systems based on conviction
offenses, as in Minnesota and Oregon, enables plea bargaining
lawyers to pick the applicable guidelines range and thereby greatly
limit the judge's options. The federal commission adopted its
"relevant conduct" approach to sentencing in order to offset the
influence of plea bargaining, but by requiring judges at sentencing
to take account of uncharged behavior, and behavior alleged in
dropped or acquitted charges, the commission's approach raises
difficult issues of principle/ ° In addition, this approach has not
managed to avoid increased prosecutorial influence. Many judges
argue that the guidelines have shifted power to the prosecutor. 41
The sentencing commission idea will survive the federal de-
bacle. To be sure, the federal example raises skepticism in many
states. In both North Carolina and Texas, for example, commis-
sions at early meetings adopted resolutions expressly repudiating
the federal guidelines as a model for anything they might develop. 42
At a meeting of state sentencing commissions following this sym-
posium, an Ohio representative reported that its commission early
in its work resolved that Ohio should not adopt the type of rigid
39. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION-INTER-
MEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 37-110 (1990).
40. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 101 (1993).
41. See Heaney, supra note 11; FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 10.
42. See generally Knapp, supra note 38, at 680 & n.5.
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sentencing guidelines exemplified by the federal guidelines. State
policymakers apparently are able to distinguish between the merits
and promise of Judge Frankel's proposal and the demerits and
failures of the federal experience. As it enters its third decade,
Judge Frankel's sentencing commission idea is alive and thriving.
